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It is traditionally thought that metaphorical utterances constitute a spe-
cial—nonliteral—kind of departure from lexical constraints on meaning. 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson have been forcefully arguing against 
this: according to them, relevance theory’s comprehension/interpretation 
procedure for metaphorical utterances does not require details specifi c to 
metaphor (or nonliteral discourse); instead, the same type of comprehen-
sion procedure as that in place for literal utterances covers metaphors as 
well. One of Sperber and Wilson’s central reasons for holding this is that 
metaphorical utterances occupy one end of a continuum that includes 
literal, loose and hyperbolic utterances with no sharp boundaries in be-
tween them. Call this the continuum argument about interpreting meta-
phors. My aim is to show that this continuum argument doesn’t work. 
For if it were to work, it would have an unwanted consequence: it could 
be converted into a continuum argument about interpreting linguistic 
errors, including slips of the tongue, of which malaprops are a special 
case. In particular, based on the premise that the literal–loose–meta-
phorical continuum extends to malaprops also, we could conclude that 
the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure for malaprops does not 
require details specifi c to linguistic errors, that is, details beyond those 
already in place for interpreting literal utterances. Given that we have 
good reason to reject this conclusion, we also have good reason to rethink 
the conclusion of the continuum argument about interpreting metaphors 
and consider what additional (metaphor-specifi c) details—about the role 
of constraints due to what is lexically encoded by the words used—might 
be added to relevance-theoretic comprehension procedures.
Keywords: Ad hoc concepts, fi gurative language use, inferential 
comprehension procedures, linguistic error, literal language use, 
literal–metaphorical continuum, loose use, malapropism, metaphor, 
relevance theory, Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson.
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1. Introduction1
It has been three decades since Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson 
(1986/1995) fi rst formulated their infl uential framework for the study 
of communication: relevance theory. Their paper “A Defl ationary Ac-
count of Metaphor” (2008) contains the two authors’ most recent posi-
tion on metaphor. They set out to show that 
[t]here is no mechanism specifi c to metaphors, no interesting generalisation 
that applies only to them. In other terms, linguistic metaphors are not a 
natural kind, and ‘metaphor’ is not a theoretically important notion in the 
study of verbal communication. (Sperber and Wilson 2008: 97) 
Accordingly, Sperber and Wilson hold that relevance theory’s inferen-
tial procedures for comprehending/interpreting linguistic utterances 
do not include any metaphor-specifi c details. In this paper, my primary 
aim is to reconstruct and assess what I take to be the authors’ central 
argument—which I will call the continuum argument about interpreting 
metaphors—to the conclusion that there are no interesting metaphor-
specifi c generalizations that a study of verbal communication should 
include. I will show that in the light of considerations about linguistic 
errors of various sorts, including malaprops, we have reason, fi rst, to 
reject the continuum argument about interpreting metaphors and, sec-
ond, to consider what metaphor-specifi c details are worth making room 
for within relevance-theoretic comprehension procedures: details that 
spell out the status of lexically driven constraints on interpretation. 
This paper is primarily concerned with setting up the fi rst (negative) 
project, I will briefl y discuss the second (positive) proposal about devel-
oping relevance-theoretic inferential comprehension procedures, and 
plan to explore it further in future work.
Mrs. Malaprop, a character in Sheridan’s (1775) play The Rivals 
had a tendency to make linguistic errors of a special sort: she would 
describe people as being “the pineapple of politeness” (when she meant 
pinnacle); or “as headstrong as an allegory on the banks of the Nile” 
(when she meant alligator). Such slips of the tongue have since come to 
be called malaprops. In a framework like relevance theory, how might 
we characterize the process of interpreting malaprops as opposed to in-
terpreting literal utterances? We will see that addressing this question 
exposes a challenge for the relevance-theoretic treatment of metaphori-
cal utterances.
Within philosophy of language as well as rhetoric the following 
claims are widely held, considered platitudinous even: the distinction 
between literal and fi gurative discourse carries theoretical importance, 
and metaphorical utterances clearly fall on the fi gurative side of the 
divide, constituting departures from literality. Relevance theory calls 
into question these time-worn claims.
1 This paper builds on and expands a shorter predecessor (Zvolenszky 2015).
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Relevance theory has, since its inception, become a leading research 
program in pragmatics. Its founders’, Sperber’s and Wilson’s most re-
cent position on metaphorical utterances is that (i) the interpretation/
comprehension procedure for metaphors does not require resources be-
yond those already needed to account for literal utterances (call this 
the procedure claim), and (ii) metaphorical utterances occupy one end 
of a continuum that includes literal, loose and hyperbolic utterances 
(call this the continuum claim). Relevance theorists seem to regard the 
continuum claim as one reason to hold the procedure claim; call this 
the continuum argument about interpreting metaphors. 
Sperber and Wilson subscribe to this continuum argument: 
We see this continuity of cases, and the absence of any criterion for distin-
guishing literal, loose, and metaphorical utterances, as evidence not just 
that there is some degree of fuzziness or overlap among distinct categories, 
but that there are no genuinely distinct categories, at least from a descrip-
tive, psycholinguistic or pragmatic point of view. Even more important than 
the lack of clear boundaries is the fact that the same inferential procedure 
is used in interpreting all these different types of utterance. (2008: 111–112, 
emphasis added) 
In this paper, I aim to show that the continuum argument about meta-
phors, if it were to work, would face an unacceptable consequence: the 
argument would license a continuum argument about interpreting mal-
aprops (and more generally, a continuum argument about linguistic 
errors):
Continuum premise for malaprops: The literal–loose–metaphorical continu-
um extends to malaprops.
Procedure conclusion for malaprops: The relevance-theoretic comprehen-
sion procedure for malaprops does not require details beyond those needed 
to account for literal utterances. 
We have good reason to resist the malaprop conclusion: surely, when 
we manage to interpret Mrs. Malaprop as having meant ‘alligator’ 
when she said ‘allegory’, the fact that the lexically encoded meaning 
of ‘allegory’ becomes wholly irrelevant is a detail that is bound to be 
featured in a full description of our process of interpreting her. And if 
we want to resist the malaprop conclusion, then we have to fi nd fault 
with the continuum argument about interpreting malaprops. There are 
two strategies we could follow: we could fault the premise or fault the 
argument itself as non-truth-preserving. I will argue that the former 
strategy is not open to us, so our remaining option is to regard the 
malaprop argument as non-truth-preserving. But then (I shall argue) 
we have to say the same about the continuum argument about inter-
preting metaphors also. Whether the comprehension procedure for 
interpreting metaphors includes any details specifi c to metaphor (or 
nonliteral discourse) therefore remains an open question. 
After some background on relevance theory (Section 2) and prelimi-
nary considerations about a recurring analogy-based reasoning strat-
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egy prevalent in the philosophical literature on metaphor (Section 3), 
I will formulate the continuum argument as a special instance of the 
analogy-based reasoning strategy (Section 4). I will then outline my 
malaprop objection (Section 5) and defl ect a counterobjection to it (Sec-
tion 6), concluding with some remarks on how the inferential compre-
hension procedure might be supplemented to include metaphor-specifi c 
details (Section 7).
2. Relevance theory, the literal–loose–metaphorical 
continuum, and ad hoc concepts
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995, also, Wilson and Sperber 2012) 
relevance-theoretic framework outlines an inferential comprehension 
procedure that hearers follow in arriving at an interpretation of speak-
ers’ linguistic utterances. Crucially, the comprehension procedure is 
delimited and guided by specifi c assumptions about relevance (i)–(iii), 
accepted by speakers and hearers alike. (i) Cognition (generally, not 
just in the case of communication) aims to maximize relevance (this 
is the cognitive principle of relevance). (ii) Linguistic utterances com-
municate a presumption of their own optimal relevance (this follows 
from the communicative principle of relevance2). And (iii) an utterance 
is presumed to be optimally relevant if and only if it is at least relevant 
enough to be worth the speaker’s effort to process it, and it is the most 
relevant utterance compatible with the speaker’s abilities and prefer-
ences. The kind of inference involved in the relevance-theoretic com-
prehension procedure is inference to the best explanation (Allot 2013). 
The concepts encoded by the words the speaker has used on a given 
occasion are mere starting points for arriving, via inferential steps, at 
an interpretation of her utterance: her utterance’s explicit content (the 
speaker’s explicit meaning) on the one hand, and its implicit content 
(which consists of implicit premises and conclusions) on the other. 
By explicit and implicit content, we mean content that was intended 
as such by the speaker. The hearer’s task is to reconstruct the explicit 
content and implicit premises and conclusions that the speaker has 
intended to communicate. Of course, rarely, if ever do hearers converge 
on the very same concepts as those that speakers actually meant. 
Nor is this required for successful communication. It suffi ces that the 
concepts reconstructed by the hearer be ones that allow him to draw 
(nearly enough) the same inferences as those intended by the speaker; 
it is enough that the reconstructed concepts “activate contextual im-
plications that make the utterance relevant as expected” (Sperber and 
Wilson 2008: 110).
2 Our concern here is with acts of linguistic communication, but the communicative 
principle and the relevance-theoretic framework are intended to apply to a broader 
range of cases: acts of ostensive communication which include, besides linguistic 
utterances, certain kinds of non-linguistic acts also.
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A recurring example of Wilson and Sperber’s (2002, see also Sperber 
and Wilson 2005, 2008) exemplifi es loose use: 
(1) Holland is fl at.
uttered in the context of the following conversation: Peter and Mary are 
discussing their next cycling trip. Peter has just said that he feels rath-
er unfi t. Mary replies: “We could go to Holland. Holland is fl at.” Wilson 
and Sperber (2002) illustrate the inferential comprehension procedure 
via which Peter interprets Mary’s second sentence as follows.
(a) Mary has said to Peter, ‘Hol-
land is fl at’. 
Decoding of Mary’s utterance. 
(b) Mary’s utterance is optimally 
relevant to Peter. 
Expectation raised by the recogni-
tion of Mary’s utterance as a com-
municative act, and acceptance 
of the presumption of relevance it 
automatically conveys. 
(c) Mary’s utterance will achieve 
relevance by giving reasons for her 
proposal to go cycling in Holland, 
which take account of Peter’s im-
mediately preceding complaint 
that he feels rather unfi t. 
Expectation raised by (b), together 
with the fact that such reasons 
would be most relevant to Peter at 
this point. 
(d) Cycling on relatively fl atter 
terrain which involves little or no 
climbing is less strenuous, and 
would be enjoyable in the circum-
stances. 
First assumption to occur to Peter 
which, together with other appro-
priate premises, might satisfy ex-
pectation (c). Accepted as an im-
plicit premise of Mary’s utterance. 
(e) Holland is FLAT* (where FLAT* 
is the meaning indicated by ‘fl at’, 
and is such that Holland’s being 
FLAT* is relevant-as-expected in 
the context). 
(Description of) the fi rst enriched 
interpretation of Mary’s utterance 
as decoded in (a) to occur to Peter 
which might combine with (d) to 
lead to the satisfaction of (c). In-
terpretation accepted as Mary's 
explicit meaning. 
(f) Cycling in Holland would in-
volve little or no climbing. 
Inferred from (d) and (e). Accepted 
as an implicit conclusion of Mary’s 
utterance. 
(g) Cycling in Holland would be 
less strenuous, and would be en-
joyable in the circumstances.
Inferred from (d) and (f), satisfy-
ing (b) and (c) and accepted as an 
implicit conclusion of Mary’s ut-
terance.
Table 1. Interpretation of Mary’s utterance ‘Holland is fl at’.
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As indicated on line (e) (in boldface), the explicit content of Mary’s ut-
terance of (1) is ‘Holland is FLAT*’. FLAT* is an ad hoc concept Peter 
arrived at that is distinct from, broader3 than the lexicalized concept 
encoded by the word ‘fl at’ in the given context of utterance: say, FLAT1. 
Unlike FLAT*, the extension of FLAT1 doesn’t include imperfectly fl at sur-
faces like the Dutch landscape.
Loose use, as in (1), is a type of literal discourse4 that involves some 
departure from the lexically encoded concept. While the departure is 
greater than in many other instances of literal discourse, Sperber and 
Wilson (2008: 107) stress that the comprehension procedure for some 
literal utterances (to wit: cases of loose use and narrowing) already 
involves the formation of ad hoc concepts. They suggest further that 
even in literal utterances that do not involve a departure from the lexi-
cally encoded concept, the process of disambiguating the expressions 
used involves inferential steps similar to those in Table 1. For example, 
Mary’s and Peter’s idiolect may have (at least) two senses associated 
with the word ‘fl at’, one of which amounts to, say, “having a smooth, 
even surface” while the other, to “is in a horizontal position”; Sperber 
and Wilson (2008: 111) suggest that if Mary uttered
(2) My computer screen is fl at,
the process of interpreting her utterance and deciding that she has in 
mind the fi rst and not the second sense of ‘fl at’ would take a similar 
inferential procedure as the one seen in Table 1.
Sperber and Wilson (2008) gradually build up a continuum of cases 
with no clear boundaries in between them. The continuum includes 
cases of disambiguation like (2), various examples of 
• loose use (or broadening), covering a broad range:
  • Approximation: ‘Holland is fl at’;
  • Limited category extension: ‘Here is a Kleenex’, said of a piece 
   of non-Kleenex-brand tissue;
  • Creative category extension: ‘For luggage, pink is the new 
   black’;
• Hyperbole: ‘Joan is the kindest person on earth’;
• Nonpoetic metaphor: ‘Joan is an angel’;
• Poetic metaphor: ‘The fog comes on little cat feet’ (from Carl 
 Sandburg’s poem The Fog).
3 Alternatively, according to another prominent relevance theorist, Robyn 
Carston (2002), the formation of ad hoc concepts involves conceptual narrowing 
as well as broadening. My malaprop objection can be straightforwardly adapted to 
work against Carston’s proposal also.
4 In their early work, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 234) already stress the 
literal status of instances of loose use:
[i]f someone says, It’s 5 p.m., she should not be taken to task if it turns out to be 
fi ve minutes or two minutes to, unless the relevance of the utterance depends 
on that kind of exactitude… The examples discussed so far would normally be 
treated as loose uses of language, but would not be regarded as fi gurative: there 
is no temptation to invoke the substitution of a fi gurative for a literal meaning.
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A central claim of relevance theory (besides Sperber and Wilson’s work, 
see also Carston 2002) is that each of the listed cases involves the for-
mation of an ad hoc concept, one that—as we go down the list of exam-
ples—exhibits a gradually greater degree of departure from the concept 
lexically encoded by the word used, that is, the concept that serves as 
one of the starting points for the comprehension procedure. The ad hoc 
concepts are then featured as part of the explicit content attributed to 
the speaker (as in line (e) in Table 1). The ad hoc concepts for the listed 
examples (except for poetic metaphors, to be discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 6) are as follows:
• FLAT*, whose extension includes imperfectly fl at surfaces like the 
 Dutch landscape;
• KLEENEX*, whose extension includes paper tissues that aren’t 
 Kleenex brand;
• BLACK*, whose extension includes (roughly) objects 
 of a fashionable, trendy color, among them pink suitcases;
• KINDEST PERSON ON EARTH*, whose extension includes people who 
 are very kind, but not even close to being among the kindest;
• ANGEL*, whose extension includes nonangelic human beings who 
  are very kind.
3. A recurring analogy-based reasoning strategy 
in the metaphor literature
Imagine us in the middle of a discussion about Woody Allen’s 2005 fi lm 
Match Point; I contribute the following metaphorical5 utterance:
(3) The fi lm’s plot is fl at.
It is customary to distinguish the literal import of such an utterance 
(which is quite outlandish: about a non-concrete thing like a story line 
literally having an even surface) and its metaphorical import (roughly: 
that the story line of the fi lm lacks imagination / is banal, prosaic / is pre-
dictable and simple-minded / is without complexity, layers or depth).
A recurring motif in theories of metaphor is the following analogy-
based reasoning strategy.
5 Arguably, ‘fl at’ as used in (3) has become a dead metaphor, and the sense of ‘fl at’ 
as dull and prosaic has become lexicalized over time, refl ected in major dictionaries. 
I use this example to keep it close to Sperber–Wilson’s ‘Holland is fl at’. I ask those 
readers who think (3) is not a metaphorical utterance but contains a dead metaphor 
to (a) substitute one of the usual examples in (3)’s place like ‘Sam is a bulldozer’ or 
‘My chiropractor is a magician’, and / or (b) consider that numerous major dictionaries 
construe these very uses of ‘bulldozer’ and ‘magician’ as dead metaphors also, listing 
as one of their senses, respectively “an overbearing person, a bully” (American 
Heritage), and “a person who has amazing skills” (Merriam-Webster).
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ANALOGY-BASED REASONING STRATEGY
Premise 1: Metaphorical import and X-type import resemble one 
another in a theoretically important respect: both are P.
Premise 2: X-type import is obviously Q.
Conclusion: We have good reason to think that metaphorical import 
is Q also.
We can think of P predicates as premise predicates (featured in Premise 
1) and Q predicates as conclusion predicates that, based on the analogy 
at hand, are true of metaphorical import. The analogy-based reasoning 
strategy is of key importance in Grice’s as well as Davidson’s argu-
ments about metaphor. Let’s take a brief look at these to illustrate 
the strategy at work before considering the role of this strategy in the 
context of relevance theory.
In the case of Grice’s (1975) theory of metaphor, we can substitute 
the following for X, premise predicates P and conclusion predicates Q:
ANALOGY-BASED REASONING STRATEGY IN GRICE
X = conversational implicature,
P1 = unlike what the speaker has (strictly speaking) said (or made 
as if to have said)
Q1 = derivable based on conversation-guiding norms (such as the 
Cooperative Principle and the maxims)
Q2 = propositional, can be characterized in terms of truth conditions
(P1, Q1 and Q2 are illustrations, we could go on and list further in-
stances of premise predicates and conclusion predicates at play. 
Also, one might question the sorting of premise predicates and con-
clusion predicates: in the context of a specifi c Gricean argument 
/ interpretation thereof. For example, Q2 could be construed as a 
premise predicate also.)
This way, in the Gricean reasoning about metaphor, conversational 
implicatures play a central role: what drives Grice’s argument is that 
metaphorical import is like conversational implicatures in certain (the-
oretically important) respects, so in other respects they are alike also. 
We can say that Grice’s theory of metaphor crucially relies on the anal-
ogy between metaphor and conversational implicatures.
In the case of Davidson’s (1978) theory of metaphor, the following can 
substituted for X, premise predicates P and conclusion predicates Q:6
ANALOGY-BASED REASONING STRATEGY IN DAVIDSON:
X = the import/purpose/communicative function of a joke
P1 =–“can make us appreciate some fact, … but not by standing for 
or expressing that fact” (Davidson 1978: 46)7
P2 = not propositional, cannot be characterized in terms of truth con-
ditions
6 This strategy is employed in Lepore and Stone (2010) neo-Davidsonian proposal 
also.
7 Notice the similarity between the Gricean and the Davidsonian P1 predicates.
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Q1 = cannot be characterized as some sort of meaning or content 
that is distinct from literal meaning/content
Q2 = is based on the idea that sometimes we use words in such a way 
that we are relying on their conventional meanings in order to make 
our audience see one thing (for example, a fi lm’s plot) as something 
else (something with an even surface)
(P1, P2, Q1 and Q2 are illustrations, we could go on and list further 
instances of premise predicates and conclusion predicates at play. 
Also, one might, again, question the sorting of premise predicates 
and conclusion predicates: for example, P1 could also be construed 
as a conclusion predicate in specifi c Davidsonian arguments or in-
terpretations thereof.)
This way, in Davidson’s as well as neo-Davidsonian theorists’ reason-
ing (for example Lepore and Stone 2010) jokes play a central role: what 
drives their arguments is that metaphorical import is like the import or 
purpose of a joke in certain (theoretically important) respects (particu-
larly P2), so in other respects they are alike also. We can say that Da-
vidsonian theories of metaphor crucially rely on the analogy between 
metaphor and jokes.
From its inception, Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory has promi-
nently featured the analogy-based reasoning strategy (1986/1995, 1990, 
2004, 2005, 2008, also, Wilson and Sperber 2002). And their X is none 
other than cases of loose use or broadening, as in (1) (‘Holland is fl at’).
ANALOGY-BASED REASONING STRATEGY IN SPERBER–WILSON, with brief 
commentary:
X = the import (explicit content) of utterances involving loose use
P1= propositional, can be captured in terms of truth conditions
P2 = is on the same continuum with other instances of language 
use traditionally thought to be literal,8 loose, hypberbolic and meta-
phorical: it is only a matter of degree to what extent the lexically 
encoded concept is being broadened to yield the concept featured in 
the explicit content of the utterance
Q1 = is arrived at via the process of constructing an ad hoc concept
 • Recall that an ad hoc concept is broader than the lexically 
  encoded concept associated with the expression uttered (which is 
  no more than a departure point for the comprehension process).
8 The upshot of Sperber and Wilson (2008) is that the traditional notion of literal 
doesn’t serve a theoretical purpose in a theory of communication: the category of 
literal utterances turns out to encompass loose use, hyperbole as well as metaphor 
(poetic as well as nonpoetic). When they talk about a literal–loose–metaphorical 
continuum, it would be odd to apply their own sense of ‘literal’: for then the fi rst label 
would be an overarching one that covers cases of the other two also: loose use and 
metaphor. Instead, plausibly, when Sperber and Wilson discuss the ‘literal–loose–
metaphorical’ continuum, they are using ‘literal’ in the traditional sense instead. 
This way, literal (in the traditional sense) does not include cases of loose use or 
metaphor.
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• For example, according to Sperber and Wilson, the explicit 
 content of (1) is ‘Holland is FLAT*’ (as in Table 1), where FLAT* 
 is an ad hoc concept whose extension includes approximately 
 fl at things also, ones that are not included in the extension of 
 the lexically encoded concept for the given use of fl at, say, FLAT1. 
 Holland is an example of something included in the extension 
 of FLAT* but not FLAT1.
Q2 = is interpreted via an inferential comprehension procedure 
that contains only such details that are already needed to inter-
pret literal utterances
Q3 = involves no departure from literal discourse
• Importantly, as we have seen above, Sperber and Wilson con-
 sider it evident that (1) (featuring loose use) is an instance of li-
 teral language use.
(In what follows, I will set aside Q3: even though it is a prominent claim 
in Sperber and Wilson’s argument, it doesn’t add to the specifi c argument 
of theirs that I am about to examine, which already mentions literality in 
Q2.) Notice that here, again, we could construe differently which predi-
cates count as premise predicates and which as conclusion predicates; 
for example, Q1 could be construed as a premise predicate instead.)
4. The continuum argument about interpreting metaphors
We are now in a position to formulate in far more depth and detail 
Sperber and Wilson’s (and other relevance theorists’) central argument 
about interpreting metaphors. 
SPERBER–WILSON’S ANALOGY-BASED REASONING ABOUT METAPHOR
Premise 1: Metaphorical import and the content of loose use resem-
ble one another in a theoretically important respect, P2: they are on 
the same continuum with other instances of language use tradition-
ally thought to be literal (including loose use) as well as hyperbolic, 
metaphorical language use.
Premise 2: The content of loose use is obviously 
  Q1 (is arrived at via the process of constructing an ad hoc concept), 
  and
  Q2 (is interpreted via a relevance-theoretic inferential procedure 
  that contains only such details that are already needed to interpret 
  literal utterances).
Conclusion: We have good reason to think that metaphorical import is
  Q1 (is arrived at via the process of constructing an ad hoc concept), 
  and
  Q2 (is interpreted via an inferential comprehension procedure 
  that contains only such details that are already needed to inter
  pret literal utterances).
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For exposition, let us simplify, relabel and reword things a bit:
THE CONTINUUM ARGUMENT ABOUT INTERPRETING METAPHORS (fi nal version)
Premise 1. The continuum premise for metaphors:
All metaphorical utterances (poetic and nonpoetic alike) can be lo-
cated on a continuum of cases that includes loose use (a kind of 
literal use) as well as hyperbolic and metaphorical uses.
Premise 2. Ad-hoc-concept premise for metaphors:
The process of forming ad hoc concepts to arrive at the explicit con-
tent attributed to the speaker is all that the inferential comprehen-
sion procedure requires in order to capture the process of interpret-
ing instances of loose use.
Procedure conclusion for metaphors:
The process of forming ad hoc concepts to arrive at the explicit con-
tent attributed to the speaker is all that the inferential comprehen-
sion procedure requires in order to capture the process of interpret-
ing metaphorical utterances.
The upshot of the procedure conclusion is this: equipped with the rel-
evance-theoretic comprehension procedure and the ad hoc concept for-
mation tool, both already required for interpreting literal utterances 
like loose use, we have all the resources needed to describe the com-
prehension procedure at play during the interpretation of metaphori-
cal utterances. No further details specifi c to metaphor (or fi gurative 
language use) are needed in a comprehensive account of interpreting 
metaphors.
In Section 5, I will raise an objection that purports to show that the 
continuum argument about interpreting metaphors is fl awed: even if 
we accepted both of its premises, that is not reason enough to accept its 
conclusion also. I will motivate this by giving what I think is an entirely 
parallel argument about malaprops—the malaprop objection—with a 
clearly false conclusion. Someone might then raise a counterobjection: 
the argument about malaprops has a false conclusion because it has 
either a false premise or fails to provide a strictly parallel argument. 
We have two options, the counterobjection goes. (i) We can maintain 
(as relevance theorists do) the continuum premise for metaphors while 
resisting its counterpart about malaprops. Or (ii) we can claim that the 
two arguments are not entirely parallel after all because of the specifi cs 
of the ad hoc concept tool. In Section 6, I will elaborate this counter-
objection and defl ect it by showing that (i) the continuum premise for 
metaphors is no more plausible than its counterpart for malaprops, 
and (ii) relevance theorists’ ad hoc concept tool is highly unconstrained 
and powerful, so nothing about its specifi cs prevents its extension to 
malaprops; therefore, the metaphor and malaprop arguments are ex-
actly parallel after all. The upshot: the malaprop objection has traction 
and there is room to reject the procedure conclusion for metaphors, 
despite relevance theorists’ arguments to the contrary.
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5. The malaprop objection
Once we have accepted the continuum argument about interpreting meta-
phors, along with its premises and conclusion, we have, I claim, no reason 
to resist making the same moves with respect to a parallel argument about 
malaprops (and more generally, about linguistic errors):
THE CONTINUUM ARGUMENT ABOUT INTERPRETING MALAPROPS
Premise 1. The continuum premise for malaprops:
All malaprops can be located on a continuum of cases that includes 
loose use (a kind of literal use) as well as hyperbolic and metaphori-
cal uses.
Premise 2. Ad-hoc-concept premise for malaprops:
The process of forming ad hoc concepts to arrive at the explicit con-
tent attributed to the speaker is all that the inferential compre-
hension procedure requires in order to capture the process of inter-
preting instances of loose use. (Same as the previous Premise 2 for 
metaphors.)
Procedure conclusion for malaprops:
The process of forming ad hoc concepts to arrive at the explicit con-
tent attributed to the speaker is all that the inferential comprehen-
sion procedure requires in order to capture the process of interpret-
ing malaprops.
The upshot of the procedure conclusion for malaprops is this: equipped 
with the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and the ad hoc 
concept formation tool, both already required for interpreting literal 
utterances like loose use, we have all the resources needed to describe 
the comprehension procedure at play during the interpretation of 
malaprops. No further details specifi c to slips of the tongue (or more 
broadly: linguistic errors) are needed in a comprehensive account of 
interpreting malaprops.
But—the malaprop objection goes—there is a fl aw in this argument: 
(a) its conclusion is clearly unacceptable and (b) it remains unaccept-
able even if we accept its premises. And if we accept all this, we have 
exposed a fl aw in the original continuum argument about interpreting 
metaphors. In the rest of this section, I aim to establish (a), in the next 
section, (b).
The procedure conclusion for malaprops leads to the following bi-
zarre results:
       • Allegory example. In interpreting Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance 
“She is as headstrong as an allegory on the banks of the Nile”, 
the explicit content that hearers arrive at involves an ad hoc 
concept ALLEGORY*, which is constructed by broadening the con-
cept lexically encoded by the word ‘allegory’ (about a certain kind 
of trope or fi gure of speech) in such a way that its extension in-
cludes alligators. The comprehension procedure is basically the 
same as that in Table 1, it’s just that the degree of departure to 
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get from FLAT1 to FLAT* is not as great as that from ALLEGORY1 to 
ALLEGORY*.
       • Spanking example. In interpreting George W. Bush’s utterance 
in the context of a speech he gave at a school “I want to spank 
all teachers” (he meant thank all teachers), the explicit content 
that hearers arrive at involves an ad hoc concept SPANK*, which 
is constructed by broadening the concept lexically encoded by 
the word ‘spank’ (about slapping) in such a way that its exten-
sion includes acts of thanking. The comprehension procedure is 
basically the same as that in Table 1, it’s just that the degree of 
departure to get from FLAT1 to FLAT* is not as great as that from 
SPANK1 to SPANK*.
As mentioned before, the continuum argument about malaprops is 
readily extended to linguistic errors of all sorts, including slips of the 
tongue other than malaprops as well as mistaken translations like the 
following:
       • Steak example. In interpreting a German speaker’s order in a 
restaurant “I want to become a steak” (‘bekommen’ in German 
means ‘get’), the explicit content that hearers arrive at involves 
the ad hoc concept BECOME*, which is constructed by broadening 
the concept lexically encoded by the word ‘become’ in English 
(about ‘turning into’) in such a way that its extension includes 
one thing getting another. The comprehension procedure is ba-
sically the same as that in Table 1, it’s just that the degree of 
departure to get from FLAT1 to FLAT* is not as great as that from 
BECOME1 to BECOME*.
It is bizarre to think that when we manage to interpret successfully 
the German speaker’s request to “become a steak”, we are broadening 
the concept lexically encoded by the English word ‘become’. After all, 
our grasping that he’s talking about getting a steak rather than turn-
ing into one happens despite his use of the English word ‘become’. We 
can say the same about understanding Mrs. Malaprop’s and George 
W. Bush’s utterances: it is despite the lexically encoded meaning of the 
words they have used that we manage to interpret them as having said 
something about alligators and thanking, respectively.
In the light of this, it seems that relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedures, as they stand, are missing key details that distinguish mal-
aprops (and more broadly, linguistic errors) from utterances that are 
literal or metaphorical. To wit: the procedure has to specify that in ut-
terances like ‘Holland is fl at’, ‘Joan is an angel’ (loose and metaphorical 
uses alike), the speaker has not committed a linguistic error; further, 
that the speaker (and hearer) takes the lexically encoded concept as-
sociated with her words to be in force, and would not retract her words 
when confronted with the concept lexically encoded by her words. By 
contrast, in the case of linguistic errors including malaprops, the hearer 
is rerouting the inference such that he sets aside the lexically encoded 
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concept entirely, and the speaker, when confronted with the lexically 
encoded concept, would retract his or her words: “I didn’t mean spank-
ing teachers was desirable, I wanted to talk about thanking them.” “I 
didn’t mean there were allegories on the banks of the Nile, I wanted 
to talk about alligators”. But we would have absolutely no grounds for 
seeking such additional details if we thought the continuum argument 
about malaprops worked and moreover featured true premises. If, de-
spite the argument about malaprops, we thought the additional details 
were needed, then we open the door to seeking additional details with 
which to supplement the comprehension procedure for metaphorical 
utterances also. And we thereby open the door to rejecting the conclu-
sion of the continuum argument about metaphors.
An analogy helps illuminate what my objection, if successful, shows 
with respect to Sperber and Wilson’s continuum argument about in-
terpreting metaphors. If you are at Columbus Circle in Manhattan 
and want to take the subway to the Museum of Natural History (at 
81st Street), then don’t get on the A train (the 8th Avenue Express); 
despite the fact that you would initially approach your desired desti-
nation, eventually, your train would whizz right past the Museum of 
Natural History, taking you all the way to 125th Street in Harlem, far 
away from your desired destination. Likewise: if you don’t want an in-
ferential comprehension procedure for malaprops (and other linguistic 
errors) that invokes no more than the formation of ad hoc concepts at 
work in the comprehension procedure you posited for cases of loose use, 
then don’t apply the continuum argument to metaphorical utterances, 
for you won’t be able to get off there but will be whisked straight to a 
place where you don’t want to be: the continuum argument about in-
terpreting malaprops.
6. A counterobjection defl ected
It seems natural to respond to the foregoing objection as follows: a dis-
tinguishing feature of linguistic errors, malaprops included, is that the 
speaker makes a mistake about which word form is associated with the 
lexically encoded concept that he or she wants to express: G. W. Bush 
has said ‘spank’ even though his intended concept is expressed by the 
word form ‘thank’; Mrs. Malaprop has said ‘allegory’ even though her 
intended concept is expressed by the word form ‘alligator’. Proponents 
of this counterobjection may then claim: of course the swapping of word 
forms, and the fact that the hearer recognizes the swap and reroutes 
the inference accordingly, will be part of the comprehension procedure 
via which he interprets malaprops and the like. We are in no way forced 
to regard the alligator, spanking and steak examples as cases involv-
ing simply the formation of ad hoc concepts with extreme degrees of 
departure from the lexically encoded concepts that had served as start-
ing points for the construction of the ad hoc concept. This is how the 
counterobjection goes.
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Someone could maintain this line while holding on to the continuum 
argument about metaphors and its conclusion, by denying either (i) the 
fi rst premise of the continuum argument about malaprops or (ii) the 
link between the second premise and conclusion of the malaprop argu-
ment (without undermining the link in the metaphor argument). This 
would amount to showing either (i) that—in the context of relevance 
theory—extending the literal–metaphorical continuum to malaprops 
(and other linguistic errors) is unfounded, or (ii) that—again, in the 
context of relevance theory—the tool of ad hoc concept construction is 
such that it is readily applicable to loose use and metaphors but not to 
malaprops and other linguistic errors (the nature of the tool would then 
be such that it would license the transition from premises to conclusion 
in the metaphor argument but not the malaprop argument). In what 
follows, I will show that neither (i) nor (ii) will work and hence the 
counterobjection fails. My response consists of two parts:
 (i) With respect to malaprops (and other linguistic errors also) 
we can talk about a continuum of cases ranging from limited to 
extreme degrees of discrepancy between the intended concept 
and the lexically encoded one. And the limited-discrepancy cas-
es can be readily placed on the literal–metaphorical continuum 
Sperber and Wilson had posited.
 (ii) In the case of poetic metaphors, the ad hoc concept departs 
greatly from the lexically encoded one, yet Sperber and Wilson 
(and others) do not doubt that here, too, explicit content is ar-
rived at via the construction of an ad hoc concept. If the ad hoc 
concept tool is capable of that, then it is plausibly suited for cap-
turing cases like the allegory, spanking and steak examples also. 
Meanwhile, the limited-discrepancy cases fi t squarely the ad hoc 
concept formation paradigm. To resist these moves, substantial 
constraints would need to be in place about the ad hoc concept 
formation tool.
I discuss (i) and (ii) in reverse order.
(ii) is in part about poetic metaphors. We’ve already encountered 
the example from Sandburg’s poem “The fog comes on little cat feet”. 
According to Sperber and Wilson, the explicit content arrived at in the 
comprehension procedure for interpreting this line of the poem involves 
the ad hoc concept: ON-LITTLE-CAT-FEET*. What Sperber and Wilson say 
about this concept signifi es that it involves a great degree of departure 
from the lexically encoded concept: the ad hoc concept is supposed to 
help convey that the fog is spreading in a smooth, quiet, stealthy and 
deliberate way. Yet it remains quite vague what this ad hoc concept is, 
in what direction it takes off from the lexicalized concept, what does 
and does not belong in its extension. The authors offer us limited guid-
ance on these matters: ON-LITTLE-CAT-FEET*…
is the concept of a property that is diffi cult or impossible to defi ne, a prop-
erty possessed in particular by some typical movements of cats (though not 
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all of them—little cat feet can also move in violent or playful ways) and, 
according to the poem, by the fog. (Sperber and Wilson 28: 122).
As Sperber and Wilson see it, the great distance between lexicalized 
and ad hoc concepts and the vague description of the latter is no ob-
stacle to applying the ad hoc concept formation paradigm to highly 
creative, poetic metaphors. Then comparably great distances and 
vagueness characterizing ALLEGORY* (whose extension includes certain 
reptiles) and SPANK* (whose extension includes acts of thanking) should 
be no obstacle to applying the ad hoc concept formation paradigm to 
malaprops (and other linguistic errors).
(ii) is also about examples involving limited-discrepancy between 
the encoded concept and the intended one. These examples fi t squarely 
within the ad hoc concept formation paradigm, comparable to the “Here 
is a Kleenex” and “For luggage, pink is the new black” type examples. 
 Ocean example (a slip of the tongue involving limited discrep-
ancy). G. W. Bush said once: “I didn’t grow up in the ocean—as a 
matter of fact—near the ocean—I grew up in the desert. There-
fore, it was a pleasant contrast to see the ocean. And I particu-
larly like it when I’m fi shing.” In interpreting the fi rst portion of 
Bush’s utterance, via ad hoc concept formation, from the encod-
ed lexical meaning IN-THE-OCEAN1, we arrive, by broadening, to 
IN-THE-OCEAN*, whose extension includes events and things near 
the ocean.
 Library example (a mistaken translation involving limited dis-
crepancy). A French speaker says: “There is a library around 
the corner” to mean that there is bookshop around the corner 
(in French ‘libraire’ means bookshop). In interpreting the ut-
terance, via ad hoc concept formation, from the encoded lexical 
meaning of LIBRARY1, we arrive, by broadening, to LIBRARY*, whose 
extension includes bookshops. (Such an utterance could also ex-
emplify a slip of the tongue involving limited discrepancy.)
In the ocean example, the distance between IN-THE-OCEAN1 and IN-THE-
OCEAN* is no greater and no less vaguely delineated than that between 
KLEENEX1 and KLEENEX*. The same can be said about LIBRARY1 and LI-
BRARY* also.
The underdefi ned nature of the process of ad hoc concept forma-
tion (as observed with ON-LITTLE-CAT-FEET*) makes it even clearer that 
much too little is settled about this tool (what it can and cannot do) to 
prevent its application to the gradually greater departures we fi nd in 
the examples of linguistic error spanning from the library and ocean 
examples to the allegory, spanking and steak ones.
Turning to (i): limited-discrepancy examples of linguistic error (like 
the library and ocean examples) already suggest that we can plausibly 
construct a continuum of examples spanning from such examples to 
the extreme-discrepancy ones (like the allegory, spanking and steak 
examples). Further, the limited-discrepancy examples plausibly fi t 
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right onto the literal–loose–metaphorical continuum. Given all this, 
the limited-discrepancy examples make clear that considerations about 
a literal–metaphorical continuum support a literal–metaphorical–lin-
guistic-error continuum also.
This concludes my justifi cation for (i) and (ii), which together show 
that the counterobjection about swapped word forms does not under-
mine the malaprop objection I had formulated against the continuum 
argument about interpreting metaphorical utterances. After all, the 
limited-discrepancy examples of linguistic error make clear that the 
continuum premise for malaprops (and other linguistic mistakes) is 
just as plausible as the continuum premise for metaphors. In addition, 
the lack of constraints on the ad hoc concept formation tool makes clear 
two things: that nothing prevents its application to gradually greater 
and less determinate departures from what is lexically encoded and 
that there is no principled reason for deeming the tool fi t to handle 
highly poetic metaphors but not linguistic errors. We therefore have 
at hand two entirely parallel arguments, both with true premises, and 
the one about malaprops boasting a clearly false conclusion. Hence, the 
other argument, about metaphors, is also undermined: the truth of its 
premise is no guarantee for the truth of its conclusion.
7. Concluding remarks
The continuum argument about interpreting metaphorical utterances 
is central to Sperber–Wilson’s conclusion that “the same interpretive 
abilities and procedures” are at play in the case of loose use as well as 
metaphor (poetic and nonpoetic) (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 235, 
see also their 2008: 97, and Wilson and Carston 2007: 231). My aim 
has been to show that we need not accept this conclusion given that the 
continuum argument about interpreting metaphors is fl awed, as shown 
by its application to malaprops (and other linguistic errors).
In the wake of the malaprop objection to the continuum argument, 
several questions arise.
First, what shall we make of empirical considerations about meta-
phor processing, according to which, for example, the interpretation 
procedure for simpler metaphors is similar to that for literal utter-
ances, while interpreting highly creative or novel metaphors involves 
a markedly different procedure (for example, Gibbs 1994)?9 The dia-
lectical situation is as follows: such considerations support or under-
mine, independently of the continuum argument about interpreting 
9 More recent experimental results (for example Forgács, Lukács and Pléh 2014) 
cast doubt on earlier views positing a marked difference in the processing of novel 
metaphors and literal utterances. Carston (2010), a central fi gure of relevance 
theory, parts ways with Sperber and Wilson (2008) and posits two distinct modes 
of processing metaphorical utterances. Her distinction provides the basis for one 
way of incorporating metaphor-specifi c generalizations in relevance-theoretic 
comprehension procedures.
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metaphors, the claim that a similar comprehension procedure applies 
to literal utterances and certain types of metaphorical utterances. The 
continuum argument doesn’t—cannot—provide an objection to or fur-
ther support for such claims, because (as I have tried to argue, success-
fully, I hope) if it were to work, it would show too much, so it doesn’t 
work. Therefore the tenability of the claim about a literal–loose–met-
aphorical continuum and the application of ad hoc concept formation 
in the interpretation of metaphorical utterances will depend on other 
(experimental-data-driven) arguments.
Second, how might relevance theorists maintain the procedure con-
clusion about interpreting metaphors? They can, in response to the 
malaprop objection, explore two options. On the one hand, they may fi ll 
in various details about the nature of the literal–loose–metaphorical 
continuum in a way that makes clear why the continuum cannot extend 
to malaprops. On the other hand, they may fi ll in various details about 
and constraints on the process of constructing ad hoc concepts in a way 
that makes clear why this tool is applicable to poetic metaphors but 
inapplicable to malaprops. By framing the continuum argument and 
the malaprop objection as a special case of an analogy-based reasoning 
strategy, I hope to have provided a useful backdrop for clarifying the 
challenge confronting relevance theorists who are keen on preserving 
the procedure conclusion.
Third, it is worth considering an alternative approach: what op-
tions lie ahead if we decide to give up the procedure conclusion. This 
involves formulating a positive proposal about how to supplement the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure for interpreting meta-
phors. I address this question in work in progress (Zvolenszky Ms.), 
drawing in part on some of the considerations that provide missing 
details with which to supplement the comprehension procedure for 
interpreting malaprops and other linguistic errors (these were briefl y 
discussed in Section 5). In the case of metaphorical utterances (but 
not malaprops), the speaker (and hearer) takes the lexically encoded 
concept associated with her words to be in force, and would not retract 
her words when confronted with the concept lexically encoded by her 
words. “The fog doesn’t really walk on feline legs,” someone might chal-
lenge the poet. And he might reply: “I was speaking metaphorically. 
But I stand by my words: The fog does come on little cat feet”. Notice 
that the poet could not say (instead of: I was speaking metaphorical-
ly) “I was speaking loosely”; loose use does not license the poem’s sort 
of departure from the lexically encoded concepts at hand. This point 
gives preliminary motivation for resisting exactly alike treatment (and 
exactly alike comprehension procedures) for loose use and metaphor. 
Meanwhile, loose use as well as metaphor are markedly different from 
malaprops (and linguistic errors): Mrs. Malaprop, when challenged, 
“There are no such things as pineapples of politeness,” would (likely) 
respond: “I retract my previous words; I meant to speak about a pin-
nacle of politeness. Some of the commitments my original words had 
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accrued were inadvertent and I now reject them.”10 Such differences in 
the response to being challenged about the lexically encoded concepts 
associated with one’s words—in instances of metaphor, loose use and 
malapropism—do, I think, offer a promising starting point for the sorts 
of details that a relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure can in-
corporate in an account of metaphor. Such an account would part ways 
with Sperber–Wilson’s stance, claiming instead that there are, after 
all, interesting details and generalizations specifi c to metaphors. More 
generally: within relevance theory (and any theory of communication), 
the various ways in which lexically encoded concepts systematically 
constrain speakers’ meaning is a worthy area for in-depth exploration, 
whether an utterance involves deliberate departure from the lexically 
encoded concept (as in loose, hyperbolic and metaphorical utterances) 
or inadvertent departure (as in linguistic errors like malaprops).11
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